The week of the number 4

By , published 2026-w43-7, updated 2026-w44-6

Following the tumultuous revocation of eMudhra’s TLS certificates (and miscellaneous fallout by being a shittily run lowest bidder government contractor), what actually is the state of patching this vulnerability?

The certificates were revoked last saturday and became untrusted in a significant chunk of browsers within only a short period of time. Info about it was released on the following tuesday, so we are about 6-8 days in.

I tested a few social media and chat platforms to see if their method of embedding still trusts the revoked certificate and the results are worse than I anticipated.

To test, I posted a cache-busted link to you-have-a.problem.chir.rs1, a site with a certificate signed by one of the revoked and cracked eMudhra private keys

The results

  • Akkoma: Not Patched. Project hard-codes an out of date trust store. You can fix it by running mix deps.update in the source directory before building.
  • Bluesky Web App (Including Witchsky with Bluesky Appview): Not Patched
  • Discord: Patched, after 11 days!2
  • Fluxer: Patched3
  • Fluxfur: Not patched3
  • Mastodon, *Key: Mostly Patched.
  • Matrix: Mostly Patched. Depends on server owners, but it seems more services than not either perform adequate cert verification or have up to date trust stores
  • Signal: Patched. Previews are client-generated, as such you will have to update to get the fix. Signal also embeds its own roots it seems
  • Steam: Patched3
  • Stoat: Not patched3
  • Telegram: Not Patched
  • Telegram’s Bot API: Not patched (Thanks to Architector#4 for confirming)

I will update this post as i deem necessary

1

If this doesn’t load for you, congrats! you are patched.

2

Updated 2026-w44-6

3

According to Burner